



The protection of personal
and medical data - a call
for confidentiality
c. Eis, T. Verschoor, H. Oosthuizen
Personal data and privacy are increasingly being
threatened by a boom in technological development - the
replacement of conventional networks of communication
with the perfected combination of computer and
telecommunications. The subsequent high degree of
transparency has the potential to damage the individual's
right to 'informational self-determination'. The most
common ways of unlawfully entering a computer data
system, the reasons why an individual's information is
treated as confidential and the ethical issues involved,
international and local statutory instruments that protect
such personal information, and ways to stop the outflow
of personal information are discussed.
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'The computer with its insatiable appetite for information, its
image of infallibility, its inability to forget anything that has
been put into it, may become the heart of a surveillance
system that will turn our society into a transparent world in
which our home, our finances, our associations, our mental
and physical condition are laid bare to the most casual
observer."
On the verge of the year 2000 we are enjoying the
convenience of a society in which communication plays a
vital role. The revolution has finally arrived - the
replacement of conventional networks of communication
with the perfected combination of computer and
telecommunications. The inevitable consequence is the
creation of a bank of personal, medical and social data, with
a degree of transparency never seen before. For more than
25 centuries, a tradition of sensitivity to confidentiality has
been maintained in the context of the doctor-patient
relationship. This privacy, acknowledged virtually world-
wide, is increasingly being threatened by the technological
boom and the ongoing development of ever more
sophisticated communication networks. Even the 'causal
observer' will be able to gain access to information, thus
. potentially infringing the individual's right of 'informational
self-determination' with a consequent breach of
confidentiality.
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The computer and data
The Oxford Dictionary defines 'computer' as an 'electronic
apparatus for analysing or storing data, making calculations
or controlling machinery'. The computer is a compact
electronic instrument, working on the principle of binary
codes; it distinguishes only between 0 and 1 and thereby
memorises and retains data. This article will focus on
'personal data', which comprise data relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (Convention 108,
27 May 1982).'
Old clinical records are being replaced by electronic
memories, ready and available at less than a moment's
notice provided a request is suitably programmed.
Large quantities of patient information are stored in a
small space. This information is easily retrieved and
analysed. Communication of patient information has
become an easy and convenient part of the overall
management of a patient, for example between the treating
physician and the pathology laboratory or the medical aid
scheme. But in the storage of data lies the problem of
confidentiality, because the communication thereof has legal
implications. Privacy and the protection thereof are
important legal issues.3
The electronic data dilemma
In psychiatric practice (private and hospital), the handling of
stored data is carefully restricted by the treating physician.
Access to confidential information is prevented by
reasonable steps taken by the physician. Van der Poel and
Smit' state: 'It would have taken a very determined, devious
and enterprising person to gain unauthorized access to such
confidential information - an occurrence that, under normal
circumstances, the law cannot require a practitioner to
foresee.' But how safe is the computerised system of data
storage?
'I don't need jackhammers and atom bombs to get in
when I can walk in through the door', says Silliam Cheswick,
a network security specialist at AT+T Bell Laboratories in the
USA. In the professional (computer) scenario, security has
been described as 'so lax that passwords and other
protective devices are almost a waste of time'. Most
common ways of (unlawfully) entering a computer data
system include the following.s
Password snifters
These are small computer programmes deliberately entered
into a computer network. The explicit aim of such a 'snifter'
programme is to identify and store any key- or password for
retrieval by the writer of the programme.
Spoofing
To exploit security holes from the inside of the computer
system, it is first necessary to gain access to the
programme itself. Step two is the installing of a snifter
programme like a 'little back door' or a secret return path
back into the programme.
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The hole in the web
It is possible for an unauthorised person to enter a computer
data network (web) without clearance or a secret password.
Because of the ease with which computerised data can be
accessed, protective measures should be introduced.
Medical secrecy
There are four reasons for treating personal information as
confidential. 4
Medical ethics
'All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my
profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce
with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep
secret and will never reveal.'
The oath of Hippocrates underlines a basic element of the
doctor-patient relationship. This ancient declaration of the
individual's right to privacy is acknowledged world-wide and
has been supplemented by statutory instruments,
international conventions and declarations.""
Problems do, however, arise with the electronic
processing of medical data. Confidentiality and secrecy
alone do not protect the patient's right to informational self-
determination. Often many people are involved in this
processing, many of whom are non-physicians. Callens2
details further problems in the processing of personal
medical data, e.g. that data can be collected and stored in a
relatively short period of time, and that the individual is not
protected by the liability resulting from a physician's
negligence in disclosing confidential information. He
stresses that extreme prudence is necessary to protect the
individual!
Statutory instruments
Rule 16 of the ethical code for medical practitioners
promulgated in terms of the Medical, Dental and
Supplementary Health Services Professions Act 56 of 1974
deals with professional secrecy and reads as follows: '
'Divulging verbally or in writing any information which
ought not to be divulged regarding the ailments of a
patient except with the express consent of the patient or,
in the case of a minor, with the consent of his parent or
guardian, or in the case of a deceased patient, with the
consent of his next-of-kin or the executor of his estate.'
This rule specifies acts or omissions in respect of which
the council may take disciplinary steps.
South African common law
One's personal rights (e.g. to a good name, dignity and
privacy) are protected by a variety of legal rules. Violation of
any of these rights constitutes possible defamation,
contempt or invasion of privacy"
The intrinsic value of information (as a
means of earning a living)
Knowledge is power. It has monetary value and is protected
by the law. The unlawful disclosure of information may be
potentially damaging or hazardous - the dignity of a person
may be affected, rendering the disclosing physician liable.
'It is clear that where use is made of a computer in the
storing or processing of patient data, there is a special
risk of both an ethical and a legal sequel where other
parties may also have access to the information stored in
the computer. It goes without saying that intimate medical
data which gets (sic) into the hands of the wrong people
can cause great harm to a person's career and personal
relationships. '"
International and local legal
tools
'Any. blow to human rights is a perversion leading to the
decay of law."
Most countries in the Western hemisphere have3statutes
restricting the processing of data. In South Africa··no
legislation aimed at the explicit and sound protection of the
individual's right to privacy and identity exists. N~thlingl
recommends the introduction of adequate legislation in this
regard. It could be restricted to the data processors
currently posing a potential threat to the individual's privacy:
the government, credit bureaus and insurance companies.
The current interim constitution of South Africa guarantees
freedom of speech and expression, " but there is also a
provision that guarantees freedom of information." What
does this imply? If the government possesses information,
you have the right to gain access to it (excluding of course
information on matters of national security, commercial
confidentiality, law enforcement and issues concerning
personal privacy).
A fine line needs to be drawn between public and private
interest. In weighing the public interest against that of the
individual, Dierks" describes four areas covering nearly all
possibilities of medical data flow, namely: (I) the aim of
processing data is therapy - the individual's interest is in
his/her desire for h'ealth; the public interest entails the health
of the people; (if) health and insurance systems; (iif)
administrative areas; (iv) research, where the individual's
interest is not self-evident.
German legislation has laid down five criteria/guidelines
for the protection of data:" (I) the right to informational self-
.determination is a constitutional right (embracing all
personal data); VI) personal data may only be transmitted or
processed to serve a distinct purpose that is in the pUblic
interest; (iil) the process itself must be covered by a formal
statute in accordance with the constitution; (iv) all interested
parties affected must be reconciled; and (v) reasonable
safety procedures are required for the process.
South African criminal law does not provide sufficiently for
the protection of personal data. Malan3 is of the opinion that
protection is lacking in three respects: (I) it does not
criminalise unauthorised access to a computer; (il) it makes
no proVision for the unauthorised alteration or forgery of
data; and (iii) the unauthorised obtaining of a trade secret is
not penalised.
In the international arena, however, article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
December 1966 reads:





'Member states must forbid the computerized processing
of health related data without the relevant person's free,
explicit and written consent.'
Disclosure of data on personal matters, racial or ethnic
origins, sexual life, political, philosophical or religious
opinions and mutual insurance relationships is prohibited.7
What protective measures
should be introduced?
1. Ethical codes of conduct for every operator/person
involved in the processing of data.
2. Maximum control of his own personal data by the
individual. The individual must: (J) be aware of the mere
existence cif a databank containing his personal details;
(if) be aware of the aims of processing the specific data;
(iif) have access to the data; ljv) have access to the names of
all people who have had access to his personal data; and
(v) be able to negotiate the alteration or deletion of specific
data.'
Conclusion
South Africa falls far behind international measures to
protect personal medical data. Currently, there is no specific
legislation to protect the individual's right to informational
self-determination. Processing clerks at hospitals and non-
treating physicians have free access to personal medical
data. No codes of conduct exist for the management and
control of computerised medical data. Private physicians
and their receptionists electronically communicate private
medical data to medical aid schemes, laboratories and the
like, with no guarantee that such data will not be divulged to
unauthorised third parties.
It is suggested that legislation for the protection of
personal data be given higher priority. In the interim,
physicians, hospitals and supplementary health services are
encouraged to take all reasonable steps to prevent
unauthorised disclosure and access to the individual's
personal data.
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and tetM resistance genes
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Objective. To investigate penA and tetM resistance gene
variation of Neisseria gonorrhoeae in order to define gene
types for epidemiological monitoring and resistance
development.
Design. Isolates of N. gonorrhoeae which were
susceptible and resistant to penicillin and/or tetracycline
were selected. Strains comprised South African isolates
(22 from Bloemfontein, 13 from Transvaal, 20 from the
Cape) and 15 Botswana and 4 Namibia isolates. The penA
genes (2 kb) of a,1I strains and tetM genes (765 bp) of 11
high-level tetracycline-resistant strains were amplified and
restricted with Hpall.
Resuits and conclusions. Twelve different Hpall
fingerprint patterns were obtained from the 74 isolates
analysed for penicillin-binding protein (PBP) 2 gene (penA)
alterations. Focusing on the transpeptidase domain, 25
isolates (3 whole gene patterns, minimal inhibitory
concentrations (MICs) ~ 0,03 - 0,125 ~g/ml) had restriction
sites equivalent to those previously described for a
susceptible strain. Of the remaining 9 PBP 2 'gene groups,
25 strains fell into a designated group E. Penicillin/
penicillin + clavulanic acid MICs determined on these
group E isolates gave a range of 0,125 - 2,0 ~g/ml,
although MICs against 4 strains were ~ 0,03 ~g/ml. MICs
of penicillin/penicillin + c1avulanic acid for the 24 isolates
that contained altered PBP 2 transpeptidase gene regions
not designated group E were only ~ 0,03 - 0,125 ~g/ml.
The lack of a Hpall restriction site at nucleotide 1934 in
Department of Medical Microbiology, University of the Orange Free
State, Bloemfontein
L. J. ChalkJey. PH.D., F.1.B.M.5.
P. L. Botha, M.MED. (PATH.)
Department of Pharmacy, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg
S. van Vuuren, N.H.D.
Department of Microbiology, South African Institute for Medical
Research, Johannesburg
R. C. Ballard, PH,D. (MICROBIOL)
SAMJ Volume 85 No.8 August 1995
